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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
On March 20, 2006, plaintiff Jim Phillips fell down the steps of an outdoor stairway at his 
office building. The stairs had been rebuilt in late 2003 by the building's owner, defendant Milt 
Erhart. In replacing the second and third steps below the intermediate landing, Erhart chose not 
to use two of four bolts provided with the steps to secure them to the mounting bracket on the 
right side of the step. 1 He also did not secure the outer handrail on the left side of the stairway 
near those same steps. The stairway contained other safety defects and building code violations. 
Phillips remembered walking down the first two to three steps from the landing and then 
having the rug pulled out from under him. A photograph taken within hours of the incident 
shows the third step below the landing out of alignment with the other steps. Expert testimony 
established that the defects were clustered around the top of the stairway, just below the landing. 
None of the defects were visible to tenants using the steps. 
Jim Phillips suffered a traumatic brain injury and post-concussive syndrome, which 
included not only physical pain and suffering but also stark changes to, among other things, his 
personality, memory, and ability to function both at home and work. His wife, Gale Phillips, has 
been left to care for the couple's two special-needs children and also for Jim Phillips, who can no 
longer assist her with the two boys or many other activities of the couple's daily life. 
There is no dispute on appeal that Erhart's rebuilding of and failure to maintain the stairs 
constituted negligence as found by the jury. The questions presented concern whether, as the 
trial court ruled, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that (1) Erhart's negligence 
was an actual cause of Jim Phillips's fall and injuries, (2) Erhart was not only negligent but also 
1 This brief refers to the right and left of the stairway from the perspective of a person 
descending the stairway. 
5 
reckless, and (3) Jim Phillips's wife, Gale Phillips, suffered loss of consortium damages in an 
amount close to the amount of noneconomic damages awarded to Jim. 
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below 
The Phillipses sued Erhart for damages caused by his negligent and reckless conduct. (R. 
Vol. I at 9-16). In April 2009, their claims were tried to a jury for six days. At the close of 
plaintiffs' evidence, Erhart moved for a directed verdict, claiming there was insufficient evidence 
for the jury to find ( 1) causation or (2) ''willful or reckless" conduct for purposes of removing the 
non-economic damages cap under LC. §6-1603. (Tr. p. 921, L. 9-p. 923, L. 25).2 The court 
denied the motion, finding that "there is sufficient evidence to at least go to the jury on both 
issues." (Tr. p. 924, L. 1-5). The court reiterated this holding in the jury instruction conference. 
(Tr. p. 983, L. 1-4). 
The court instructed the jury on both issues, (R. Vol. II at 313,321), and used Erhart's 
requested instruction on ''willful or reckless". (Tr. p. 984, L. 17 - p. 992, L. 12). The jury 
returned a special verdict finding that Erhart was negligent, his negligence proximately caused 
the Phillipses' damages, and his conduct was willful or reckless. (R. Vol. II at 335-36). The jury 
awarded Jim Phillips $546,174 in economic and $562,000 in non-economic damages, and 
awarded Gale Phillips $556,200 in non-economic damages. (Id. at 336-37). The court entered 
judgment. (Id. at 338). 
Erhart moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.), a new trial, or a 
remittitur. (R. Vol. II at 340-67). The court denied his motion in all relevant respects.3 (R. Vol. 
2 The trial transcript is numbered sequentially and is not separated into volumes or designated by 
volume numbers. Therefore, we cite the transcript by page and line only: (Tr. [p.] [L.]). 
3 The court ordered a new trial on Jim Phillips' economic damages unless he accepted a 
remittitur to $253,014.49. (R. Vol. III at 582-83). Phillips accepted the remittitur, and the court 
amended its judgment accordingly. (Id. at 585-86). 
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III at 564-84). Erhart did not seek J.N.O.V. or a new trial based on lack of proximate causation, 
and the court rejected his arguments on recklessness and loss of consortium. 
With respect to recklessness, the court ruled that "a jury could reasonably conclude that 
Mr. Erhart was aware that his repairs to the stairs created a high degree of risk of injury" and that 
"injury to someone was likely." (Id. at 571). In his appellate brief, Erhart addresses evidence 
expressly cited by the court in support of this ruling. (App. Br. at 35-39). But in articulating this 
evidence, the court noted this was only "some of the evidence" from which a jury could conclude 
that Erhart was reckless. (R. Vol. III at 570-71). The court also rejected Erhart's alternative 
motion for a new trial on recklessness, noting that it was "a close question on whether Mr. Erhart 
should be found reckless. Given that, it was for the jury to decide." (Id. at 577). 
The court also rejected Erhart's contention that loss of consortium damages were 
excessive. Erhart claims the court "found" that Mrs. Phillips was "somewhat over-dramatic and 
self-interested." (App. Br. at 23, 44, quoting R. Vol. III at 579). But he omits the entire sentence 
and the remainder of the paragraph. The full paragraph states: 
Mrs. Phillips struck the court as somewhat over-dramatic and self-
interested. Were the damages based solely on her testimony as to 
her damages, the Defense would have a point. But the change in 
her life, including the added responsibility for the children, is 
corroborated by the testimony of the family physician and Dr. 
Andrews, the family counselor. 
(R. Vol. III at 579). The court added that there is no fixed ratio of economic to non-economic 
damages, as Erhart contended. (Id.). And it concluded that the award of non-economic damages 
to Gale Phillips was not so disparate from the court's own view of the evidence as to suggest that 
passion or prejudice influenced the outcome. (Id. at 580). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Erhart Decides to Replace the Steps. 
Erhart and his wife own a two-story office building at 1406 Main Street in Meridian. (Tr. 
p. 57, L. 16-21). Erhart manages the building and does the maintenance work himself, except for 
certain tasks. (Tr. p. 58, L. 16-p. 59, L. 11). He also owns two other commercial buildings. 
(Tr. p. 57, L. 24 - p. 58, L. 1 ). Owning and operating the buildings is his sole job. (Tr. p. 94, L. 
11-14). 
In October 2003, he decided to rebuild the exterior stairway at issue because the wooden 
steps were deteriorating and the carpet had become worn, and he believed they had become a 
hazard. (Tr. p. 59, L. 25 -p. 62, L. 4). He agreed that he had an obligation to keep his facilities 
safe, including his stairs, because if people fall down the stairs, they can get hurt. (Tr. p. 62, L. 
5-12). 
The stairwell has two flights. On March 20, 2006, Jim Phillips was found at the bottom 
of the lower flight, which contains 10 steps. (Tr. p. 60, L. 14-25). This is a photo of the lower 
flight-taken on the day of the incident-looking down from the landing: 
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(Exh. IA) (full scale photo in Appendix). 
2. Erhart Chooses Not To Secure Two Steps With Bolts. 
Erhart chose to replace the wooden steps with concrete steps. (Tr. p. 61, L. 7-25). Each 
step came with two L-shaped brackets, four bolts to attach the brackets to the stringers (the sides 
of the stairs), and four bolts to attach to the step. (Tr. p. 62, L. 15 -p. 63, L. 21). Erhart and a 
helper installed the new steps in a single weekend in early November 2003. (Tr. p. 63, L. 22 -p. 
64, L. 5). They went on a Saturday to barricade the stairwell and came back on Sunday to install 
the steps. (Id.) 
While installing the steps, Erhart made a fateful decision: He chose not to put two of four 
bolts supplied with the steps through brackets and into the bottom of the second and third steps 
9 
below the landing. (Tr. p. 65, L. 16 - p. 67, L. 5). He consulted with no one before making that 
choice. (Tr. p. 67, L. 6-12). This photo taken the day Mr. Phillips was hurt, March 20, 2006, 
shows the steps with the missing bolts: 
(Exh. 2, p. I (full scale photo in Appendix); see also Appendix, exh. ID). 
Erhart initially insisted it was not possible to put the bolts in one side of the two steps 
because there was an extra 3/8" gap between the stringers at this point in the staircase. (Tr. p. 
68, L. 3-10). However, he later admitted that he "certainly" could have installed the bolts using 
a shim behind the bracket. (Tr. p. 81, L. 23-25). Erhart didn't use a shim to install the bolts in 
the two steps simply because he would have had to come back another day. (Tr. p. 82, L. 1-4). 
He didn't want to slow the job down; he wanted to get it done. (Tr. p. 82, L. 5-19). 
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Erhart's own expert witness agreed that it would have been easy for Erhart to use shims 
or washers to insert the bolts and connect the brackets to the two stairs, and that this would been 
a careful construction practice. (Tr. p. 958, L. 8 - p. 959, L. 4). Indeed, this is precisely what 
Erhart did on the second flight of stairs. (Tr. p. 71, L. 7-11; Exh. 2, p. 4, attached to Appendix). 
Yet Erhart left the two steps in the first flight unsecured and didn't secure them in the two and 
one-half years between early November 2003 and March 20, 2006. 
Mechanical Engineer Tom Fries testified that the second and third steps below the 
landing violated Section 2303 of the Uniform Building Code (UBC). (Tr. p. 162, L. 9 -p. 166, 
L. 8). Section 2303 concerns structural integrity requirements for supporting dynamic loads. 
(Tr. p. 163, L. 18 - p. 164, L. 25; p. 166, L. 24-25). The stairs violated Section 2303 as of 
March 20, 2006, because the two steps were not secured on the right side. (Tr. p. 165, L. 1 - p. 
166, L. 19). 
3. Erhart Chooses to Install a Loose and Unsecured "Handrail" that is 
Not Designed to be Used as Stairway Handrail. 
Erhart chose to install a Trex brand product as a handrail. (Tr. p. 112, L. 9-15). 
However, he did not attach this "handrail" to the metal railing beside the steps. (Tr. p. 97, L. 13 -
p. 100, L. 20; exhs. IG & lH). The following picture, again taken within hours after Jim Phillips 
fall, shows his coworker, Angela Sisco, holding the handrail. The handrail is loose and 
unconnected to the railing: 
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(Exh. lG (full scale photo in Appendix); see also Appendix, exh. lH). 
The loose handrail photos show that there are no screws in the groove in the bottom of 
the handrail and there was no indication any had ever been installed. (Tr. p. 515, L. 1 - p. 516, L. 
6). Erhart had no explanation for why he chose not to attach the handrail. (Tr. p. 98, L. 7-9). It 
remained unattached three months after Jim's injury. (Tr. p. 957, L. 18 - p. 958, L. 7). And 
human factors expert Richard Gill, Ph.D., found other parts of the handrail were still loose and 
unattached in January 2008. (Tr. p. 220, L. 23 - p. 221, L. 25; exh. 21-BB). 
It was undisputed that the handrail Erhart chose violated the UBC in a variety of ways. 
The handrail was not secured, which violated UBC section 2303. (Tr. p. 166, L. 9-19). The 
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handrail also violated section 3306, which sets forth requirements for length and width (or 
"gripability''). (Tr. p. 166, L. 20-p. 167, L. 3). The handrail violated the requirement for width 
since it was 3.2 inches wide-more than an inch wider than the maximum of two inches. (Tr. p. 
169, L. 1-13). As for length, the handrail extended less than the minimum six inches past the 
step. (Tr. p. 169, L. 1-21).4 That creates a fall hazard. (Tr. p. 169, L. 1 -p. 170 L. 8) 
Indeed, both Fries and Gill explained that the "handrail" Erhart chose was not a staitway 
handrail at all. It was designed to be used as a guardrail (horizontal fencing for a deck) or for 
decorative purposes. (Tr. p. 185, L. 2-25; p. 236, L. 18 - p. 238, L. 1). 
4. The Defects in the Stairs and Handrail Cause Jim Phillips to Fall. 
On March 20, 2006, Jim Phillips fell from Erhart's stairs. Jim was 36 years old at the 
time, not 33. (Compare exh. 30 at 1 with App. Br. at 7). Shortly before the incident, Erhart had 
asked Jim's employer, Rural Community Assistance Corporation (RCAC), to move its offices 
from the front of the building to the back in order to make room for a new tenant. (Tr. p. 505, 
L. 6 - p. 507, L. 20). RCAC staff had been using the steps in question for just two and a half 
weeks before the incident. (Tr. p. 546, L. 1-12). 
a) Jim Phillips had a partial recollection of his fall. 
Contrary to Erhart's repeated assertions, and despite his brain injury, Jim did have a 
partial memory of his fall at one point in time. On April 10, 2006, he made his initial visit to 
Nancy Greenwald, M.D., a rehabilitation physician with Idaho Elks Rehabilitation Hospital who 
treated Jim Phillips. (Tr. p. 310, L. 21 - p. 311, L. 7; exh. 30). Her hospital chart notes were 
4 Fries referenced and applied two codes: the 1985 Uniform Building Code (UBC) and the 2003 
International Building Code (IBC). (Tr. p. 159, L. 18 - p. 160, L. 8). The references to sections 
2303 and 3306 are to the 1985 UBC. Fries explained that the 2003 IBC applied in Meridian in 
October 2003 and that the relevant requirements of the two codes were the same, except that the 
2003 IBC had a more stringent requirement for the distance handrails must extend past the end of 
the steps: the UBC standard was six inches, the IBC was 12 inches. (Tr. p. 168, L. 6-19). 
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stipulated into evidence at Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30. At trial, she read from her initial chart dated 
April l 0, 2006, without objection. (Tr. p. 321, L. 20-24). The chart note reads: 
He was descending a cement staircase and remembers the first two 
- three steps. He felt like the "rug was pulled out from under him" 
and he fell forward tumbling to the ground. His next recollection 
is a woman holding his hand telling him that everything was going 
to be OK. 
(Exh. 30, 4/10/06 clinic note, at 1 ). Dr. Greenwald explained that she put part of this note in 
quotes because it was the exact terminology he used. (Tr. p. 321, L. 25 - p. 322, L. 2). She 
added that Jim had a recollection of these events-descending the first two to three steps, having 
the rug pulled out from under him, and then the woman holding his hand. (Tr. p. 321, L. 18 -
p. 322, L. 19). Plaintiffs' counsel referred to this testimony and chart note in responding to 
defendant's Rule 50(a) motion, (Tr. p. 922, L. 6-18), and again in closing argument. (Tr. 
p.1006,L.19-p.1007,L.4). 
Erhart never objected to any of this evidence or argument. Erhart did not file a motion in 
limine seeking to exclude this evidence. He did not object to the admission of the chart note. He 
did not object to the reading and explaining of the note by Dr. Greenwald. And he did not object 
to counsel's references to this evidence in his Rule 50(a) argument and closing argument. 
b) The occupational medicine note, which was stipulated into 
evidence, conf"1rmed causation. 
There is additional record evidence of how the fall occurred. Three days after Jim fell, 
Gale Phillips took her husband to the occupational medicine doctor designated by the workers 
compensation insurer. (Tr. p. 887, L. 2-19). The records of that visit were stipulated into 
evidence. (Tr. p. 54, L. 1-5). The "Activity Status Report" from Jim Phillips's first visit to the 
occupational medicine doctor states, "Briefly describe how the injury occurred and what body 
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part was affected." (Exh. 26, Activity Status Rpt., 3/23/06). The response-written 
contemporaneously by Gale Phillips-reads: 
Walking downstairs, step moved, guardrail moved and fell. Legs, 
eyes, head, neck, face, back, elbows. A lot of bumps and bruises. 
(Id.). Erhart claims he objected to this evidence. He did not. 
This medical record came into evidence without objection. (Tr. p. 54, L. 1-5). The 
response was read to the jury without objection. (Tr. p. 889, L. 1-17). Gail Phillips confirmed 
that she wrote the response without objection. (Id., L. 18-22). Only when Mrs. Phillips was 
asked to tell the jury how she had learned the information, i.e., to relate her conversations with 
Jim Phillips, did Erhart's counsel object. (Tr. p. 889, L. 23 - p. 890, L. 8). The court sustained 
the objection, and reminded Erhart's counsel that it had reserved any ruling on whether Mrs. 
Phillips could testify about the conversations. (Tr. p. 890, L. 9-15). Thereafter, Mrs. Phillips 
was asked to confirm, and did confirm, that the response in the record she had read to the jury 
was accurate-again without objection. (Id., L. 16-20). Plaintiffs' counsel later read the 
response in closing argument, once again without objection. (Tr. p. 1006, L. 8-18). Erhart never 
asked for any limiting instruction concerning the information in this medical record. 
c) The physical evidence confirms where the fall occurred. 
Hours after the incident, Jim's Phillips' coworker Angela Sisco and his father Dan 
Phillips took photographs of the stairway, including all of the photos collected in Exhibit 1. 
Erhart stipulated to the admission of these photos. (Tr. p. 53, L. 1-7). 
When Sisco arrived at the scene, the first thing she noticed was that the third step from 
the top was "off-kilter." (Tr. p. 513, L. 17-24). Dan Phillips likewise noticed that the step was 
"out of place." (Tr. p. 652, L. 15 - p. 653, L. 1). Dan then took a photograph of the step while 
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standing on it. (Tr. p. 513, L. 17 - p. 514, L. 8; p. 652, L. 16 - p. 653, L. 19). This is the photo 
he took: 
(Exh. 1B (full scale photo in Appendix)). When this picture was taken, Sisco had "no doubt" 
that the step on which Dan Phillips stood, was "kinked back". (Tr. p. 553, L. 14-22). 
This "kinked-back" step is one of the steps where Erhart chose to leave out two of the 
four supplied bolts, which resulted in the step being unconnected to the L-bracket on the right 
side. (Tr. p. 516, L. 7 - p. 517, L. 25; see Appendix, exhs. lD & 2, p.1). In addition, on further 
inspection of the underside of the steps, Sisco and Dan Phillips noticed that one of the bolts that 
had been installed on the left side of the third step from the landing had no head-the head had 
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been sheared off. (Tr. p. 518, L. l - p. 521, L. 14; exh. 87). They also photographed the loose 
handrail near the landing, which was unconnected and had never been nailed down, screwed 
down, or otherwise secured. (Tr. p. 514, L. 3 - p. 516, L. 6; Appendix, exhs. l G & l H). 
d) Expert testimony confirmed that Erhart's conduct caused the fall. 
Plaintiffs' mechanical engineering expert, Tom Fries, described what happened over time 
to the third step from the landing after Erhart chose to install two bolts on the left side but left the 
right side unconnected. He opined that this would result in overloading of the left side and 
loosening of the bolts over time, and would explain what is shown in Exhibit 1-B, with the third 
step from top experiencing lateral displacement. (Tr. p. 173, L. 21 - p. 175, L. 25). 
Dr. Gill, the human factors expert, tied all of the physical evidence together in opining on 
what likely caused Jim Phillips to fall. He explained that the various safety defects were all 
centered in the same area of the stairway, as you begin to descend from the landing down the 
stairs, particularly the second and third tread from the landing. (Tr. p. 244, L. 21 - p. 245, L. 8). 
After investigating hundreds of stairway fall accidents, he explained that the tipping point, where 
the initial loss of balance occurs, is most often correlated to a defect in the stairway's design. 
(Tr. p. 245, L. 9-15). Here, there were multiple defects: the handrail didn't have a proper 
extension, did not give a good grip, and was open on one end; the stair tread was misaligned and 
susceptible to motion; and the handrail was not secured-if you pulled on it, it came loose. (Id., 
L. 16-23). He opined that this was the most likely place of the initial loss of balance-where all 
of these defects came together. (Tr. p. 245, L. 24 - p. 246, L. 2). 
5. Erhart Was Reckless. 
The evidence cited above established that in rebuilding the stairway in 2003, Erhart chose 
to do the work himself. He chose not to install two of four bolts in the right side of the second 
and third step from the landing. He chose not to get any advice on whether leaving those bolts 
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off was safe or acceptable. He chose not to use shims or washers to install the bolts, which 
would have been easy to do, and which he did on other parts of the stairway. He chose to not 
subsequently inspect it. He chose a Trex guardrail instead of a handrail. The guardrail was too 
wide. He installed the extension at the landing too short to be safe. And he did not secure the 
handrail, allowing it to easily be moved or lifted. (See supra Statement of Facts§§ 2-4). 
The evidence further established that these choices resulted in multiple building code 
violations. See supra Statement of Facts, § 2. The code sets forth minimum safety standards. 
(Tr. p. 162, L. 9-17 (Fries); p. 262, L. 12-20 (Dr. Gill)). Erhart admitted that (a) even if a 
building permit was not required, he still had to follow the building code, and (b) he violated the 
code in multiple respects. (Tr. p. 102, L. 20 - p. 106, L. 22; App. Br. at 38).5 Yet, he 
contradicted himself by claiming he could deviate from the code and follow it only "as much as 
you could." (Tr. p. 106, L. 23 - p. 108, L. 10). 
Dr. Gill opined that Erhart, a commercial building landlord, should have had a safety or 
risk management program. (Tr. p. 201, L. 15-24; p. 208, L. 2 - p. 210, L. 12). Such programs, 
he explained, need not be expensive in order to identify foreseeable hazards. (Tr. p. 210, L. 13 -
p. 211, L. 20). He noted such a program was critical because conditions that remained 
unchecked were a hazard lying in wait. (Tr. p. 211, L. 21 - p. 213, L. 3). This was the case here, 
where the defects in the staircase-for example, missing bolts underneath the steps-were not 
obvious to tenants. Erhart admitted that hidden dangers needed to be addressed expeditiously. 
(Tr. p. 93, L. 22 - p. 94, L. 4). 
5 There was conflicting evidence whether replacing the stairs required a building permit. 
( Compare Tr. p. 218, L. 22 - p. 219, L. 4, p. 262, L. 5 - p. 263, L. 17 (Dr. Gill stated that Erhart 
was required to obtain a permit for this type of job) with Tr. p. 134, L. 10-18 (Erhart stated that 
he didn't need one, though he provided no support other than his ipse dixit)). But this debate was 
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Moreover, just weeks before the incident, Erhart had been warned by another tenant, 
Kenneth Doolittle, that "at least one" of the steps on the stairway was loose. (Tr. p. 142, L. 2-14; 
p. 143, L. 18-22). Doolittle did not remember exactly which tread it was, but he told Erhart that 
the step wasn't anchored to the side, so if you pushed on it, it would slide backwards. (Tr. p. 
142, L. 15-23). He told Erhart about the problem because he thought it was hazardous. (Tr. p. 
143, L. 7-17). Erhart was thus notified about a problem with his steps precisely like the one that 
later caused Jim Phillips's fall, when an unsecured step on the same stairway slipped backwards. 
Angela Sisco was not surprised by the condition of the stairs on March 20, 2006. It was 
indicative of how everything in the building was maintained: repairs "were either half-assed 
completed or not done or pushed off." (Tr. p. 530, L. 2-6). Building residents were told to 
report problems to a maintenance worker name Dave, but he was unresponsive. (Tr. p. 530, L. 
7-19). After the incident, RCAC terminated its lease for cause. (Tr. p. 531, L. 3-6). 
6. Gale Phillips Suffered a Loss of Consortium. 
As detailed in Erhart's appellate brief, Jim Phillips suffered significant physical, 
emotional, and economic injuries as a result of the incident, including a traumatic brain injury 
and post-concussive syndrome. (App. Br. at 19-22, 43-44). Plaintiffs agree with Erhart's 
explication of the type and severity of his injuries. Adjusted for the remittitur, see supra n.3, Jim 
Phillips was awarded more than $815,000. Erhart does not challenge this award on appeal. 
Erhart does challenge the loss of consortium award to Gale Phillips. An understanding of 
both the Phillips' family's situation and the changes Jim Phillips underwent due to his injuries is 
necessary to explain the depth and breadth of Mrs. Phillips's unique losses. 
beside the point, because Erhart agreed he was required to follow the code. (Tr. p. l 02, L. 20 -
p. 108, L. 1 O; App. Br. at 38). 
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a) Pre-Injury Evidence. 
The Phillipses were high school sweethearts who married shortly after high school. (Tr. 
p. 279, L. 13 - p. 282, L. 8; p. 856, L. 16 - p. 858, L. 19). Before his injury, Jim was a romantic. 
When the couple would go fishing, he would leave cute notes or cards for Gale in the tackle box. 
(Tr. p. 871, L. 6-23 ). He was affectionate; he loved to walk up to her and kiss her on the back of 
the neck. (Tr. p. 914, L. 9-20). He was athletic and an outdoorsman. (Tr. p. 279, L. 4 - p. 281, 
L. 15; p. 645, L. 16 - p. 646, L. 11). He took Gale and the family on hunting, fishing, and 
camping trips, and trips to the water park. (Tr. p. 663, L. 17 - p. 664, L. 14). Camping, hunting, 
and fishing were "like breathing" in their household. (Tr. p. 879, L. 4-9). Jim was an extrovert, 
a joker and a teaser, while Gale is relatively shy. (Tr. p. 666, L. 21 - p. 668, L. 7). They had a 
good marriage. (Tr. p. 871, L. 24 - p. 872, L. 12). 
Jim was fully engaged with his family at home, where he and Gale were a team and 
shared household responsibilities. (Tr. p. 875, L. 14 - p. 876, L. 24). Jim was the cook, and Gale 
was the prep cook. (Tr. p. 876, L. 13-22). Jim would tease Gale because she didn't know how to 
cook. (Tr. p. 665, L. 3-10). Jim was also heavily involved in parenting the couple's two special-
needs children,  and  (Tr. p. 868, L. 7 - p. 870, L. 22). 
Shortly after he was born,  the older child now 17, was diagnosed with a brain 
twnor. (Tr. p. 859, L. 21 - p. 862, L. 16). He had surgery when he was two weeks old, and the 
doctors removed part of his occipital lobe. (Id.; Tr. p. 465, L. 10-17). As a result, he is blind in 
his right eye because his brain can't take in the information. (Tr. p. 465, L. 18-21 ). He also has 
learning disabilities and takes special classes to augment his learning. (Tr. p. 465, L. 22 - p. 466, 
L. 5). He is on medication to manage his difficulties with sleep. (Tr. p. 466, L. 6-9). He has 
received counseling and skills training for many years from Dr. Glenna Andrews. (Tr. p. 465, L. 
2 - p. 466, L. 15). 
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 the younger child now 15, has Prader-Willi syndrome, a genetic defect that is the 
opposite of Down syndrome. (Tr. p. 292, L. 2-19). Due to Prader-Willi syndrome,  is 
mentally retarded. (Tr. p. 292, L. 19-22). He has an I.Q. of 60. (Tr. p. 866, L. 25 - p. 867, L. 4). 
His disease affects many things, from his height to his appetite. (Tr. p. 292, L. 13-19). His brain 
does not know when he has had enough to eat, so he never feels full; he is always hungry. (Tr. p. 
468, L. 2-15). He has sleep apnea. (Tr. p. 867, L. 10-19). He receives counseling at the same 
clinic as  (Tr. p. 468, L. 16-21 ). 
Dr. Andrews, the family therapist, confirmed that Jim and Gale were doing one of the 
best jobs she had ever seen parenting disabled children. (Tr. p. 473, L. 14 - p. 474, L. 2). Jim 
frequently interacted with the boys' many doctors. (Tr. p. 870, L. 1-10). After cooking dinner in 
the evening, he would help one of the two boys with their homework. (Tr. p. 875, L. 14 - p. 876, 
L. 12). The boys participated in Special Olympics, and  was involved in music theater. 
(Tr. p. 876, L. 25 - p. 878, L. 1). Jim would take  to rehearsals and he eventually got 
involved himself in Music Theater of Idaho. (Tr. p. 283, L. 6 - p. 285, L. 9). The jury saw video 
of Jim dancing and singing as Daddy Warbucks in a production of Annie. (Id.; see exh. 47). 
Jim has worked most of his career for RCAC, where he provides technical assistance to 
rural communities and Native American tribes on water and sewer infrastructure. (Tr. p. 285, 
L. 14 - p. 286, L. 25; p. 288, L. 11 - p. 289, L. 8). At work, Jim was the class clown-funny, 
outgoing and gregarious. (Tr. p. 524, L. 7 - p. 525, L. 10). He would facilitate discussions at 
RCAC's annual meetings. (Tr. p. 525, L. 17-25). His former boss, George Schlender, described 
Jim as a dynamic speaker who could do a wonderful job with a last-minute task. (Tr. p. 583, L. 
25 - p. 584, L. 14). He is evaluated annually, and in the two years before he fell, he received 
"exceeds expectations" ratings. (Tr. p. 289, L. 13-20; R. Vol. III at 486-87). 
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b) Post-Injury Evidence. 
After the fall, everything changed. Suddenly, as Dr. Andrews put it, there was another 
disabled person in the home. (Tr. p. 476, L. 21 - p. 477, L. 1). Jim's fall and brain injury caused 
him to suffer, among other physical symptoms, problems with vision, balance, headaches, loss of 
taste, low thoracic pain, and other pain. (Tr. p. 324, L. 3-11 ). He had severe cognitive 
difficulties, including problems with memory, thinking, concentration, and distractibility. (Tr. p. 
344, L. 25 - p. 347, L. 20). He also experienced behavioral and emotional changes, including 
depression, anxiety, PTSD, and insomnia. (Tr. p. 347, L. 3-14). His rehabilitation doctor 
described him as being "emotionally labile," meaning he vacillates between being up and down; 
he also cries at times. (Tr. p. 326, L. 1-8). He gets exhausted, fatigued, and overwhelmed easily. 
(Tr. p. 581, L. 1 - p. 583, L. 24). 
Since the fall, Jim's whole personality has changed. (Tr. p. 677, L. 25 - p. 678, L. 3). He 
is no longer outgoing and gregarious, is introverted, doesn't like to be in groups, and prefers to 
be by himself. (Tr. p. 678, L. 3-11). He has become moody. (Tr. p. 901, L. 12-25). Gale's very 
romantic husband, who used to do sweet little things for her, started calling her bad names. (Tr. 
p. 902, L. 1-12). He is no longer affectionate and the couple has no physical intimacy. (Tr. p. 
480, L. 22-25). For the first two years after the fall, Jim slept on the couch. (Tr. p. 848, L. 15-
21 ). Jim literally did not touch Gale from the day of the fall until the day they came to court. 
(Tr. p. 914, L. 9-23). 
As described by Dr. Andrews, after the injury, Gale became Jim's external memory. (Tr. 
p. 479, L. 25 - p. 480, L. 19). Eventually, after he began to regain some of his former mental 
capacity, he became frustrated that his wife would keep reminding him of things. (Id.). 
His loss of cognitive efficiency has affected his work, where for the past two years, he 
has received "poor" and ''unacceptable" evaluations. (Tr. p. 289, L. 23 - p. 291, L. 10). Where it 
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may have taken him a day to learn material for a new presentation, it now takes ten. (Tr. p. 598, 
L. 9-18). He is forgetful and easily aggravated; instead ofletting problems roll off his back, he 
gets upset, angry, or sad, and sometimes cries. (Tr. p. 531, L. 7 - p. 534, L. 17). He is no longer 
the go-to guy who flies out to give a last-minute presentation. (Tr. p. 535, L. 25 - p. 536, L. 19). 
His problems at work-caused by his brain injury-impact his relationship with Gale. (Tr. p. 
858, L. 20 - p. 901, L. 11). 
Things are also dramatically different in the household now. Jim gets frustrated easily 
and forgets ingredients; eventually, he quit cooking altogether. (Tr. p. 656, L. 6 - p. 657, L. 11) 
Gale now does all the cooking. (Tr. p. 909, L. 22-25). By the end of the work week, he is so 
mentally fatigued that, instead of throwing the fishing and camping gear into the car and heading 
out with the family, he holes up in his room and sleeps. (Tr. p. 598, L. 24 - p. 600, L. 6). 
But as Dr. Andrews noted, probably the greatest toll on Gale is that she is now nearly a 
single parent of her two special-needs boys. (Tr. p. 487, L. 4-13). Jim can no longer help the 
boys with their homework or read to them. (Tr. p. 909, L. 22 - p. 910, L. 17). Gale either has to 
stay home or keep her cell phone with her at all times, because Jim can no longer take care of the 
kids. (Tr. p. 847, L. 8 - p. 848, L. 14). Gale must answer Cotton's questions about the facts of 
life because he can't talk to his father about it. (Tr. p. 913, L. 13 - p. 914, L. 8). 
Jim is no '.onger the one to interact with the boys' doctors and therapists; to the contrary, 
after his injury, Gale would bring Jim to the boys' appointments because she couldn't leave him 
alone. (Tr. p. 474, L. 3-16). Dr. Andrews described one such appointment, after which she and 
Gale discussed Colton's next visit. During the conversation, Jim was shuffling back and forth, 
non-communicative, and agitated. Ultimately, Gale had to have Jim's mentally retarded 
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son-take his dad to the car because Jim had become too agitated to stay for the conversation. 
{Tr. p. 474, L. 22 - p. 476, L. 4). 
Dr. Martin, the family doctor, described the couple's interactions when Gale brought Jim 
to an appointment in February 2009. Dr. Martin was struck by how often she had to reassure 
Jim, redirect his behavior, or calm him down, because Jim would get upset and irritated by little 
things. {Tr. p. 442, L. 4-16). Dr. Martin asked her to come back because he was concerned 
about the stress she was under trying to care for Jim. (Id., L. 17-25). He put her on 
antidepressant medication and encouraged her to start counseling. {Tr. p. 443, L. 1-7). 
As her friend Linda Larson describes Gale has lost her "soul mate partner." {Tr. p. 846, 
L. 11-18). When she and Gale talk, Gale often breaks down and cries. {Tr. p. 850, L. 20-22). 
Gale concluded her testimony by noting that while Jim looks the same, he is not the same person. 
{Tr. p. 918, L. 21 - p. 919, L. 8). She is trying to learn how to live with this new person. (Id.). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly rule that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
find actual cause, when, among other things, Phillips had a partial recollection of having ''the rug 
pulled out from under him" after the second or third step below the landing, the third step was 
unconnected and out-of-place the day of the fall, and expert testimony confirmed that the defects 
in the stairway were centered near the top of the landing, including the second and third steps? 
2. Did the court properly rule that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find 
reckless misconduct, when, among other things, Erhart created multiple defects and committed 
multiple building code violations in replacing the stairway, the safety defects in the stairs were 
hidden, Erhart was warned of a sliding step, and Erhart admitted that hidden hazards must be 
eliminated expeditiously but failed to do so for almost two and a half years? 
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3. Did the court properly exercise its broad discretion in upholding the jury's loss of 
consortium award to Gale Phillips, when the court specifically applied the standard in IRCP 
59(a)(5) and found that the amount awarded was not so disparate from the court's own view of 
the evidence as to suggest that passion or prejudice influenced the award? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
Erhart's negligence caused Jim Phillips's fall. In arguing to the contrary, Erhart disregards the 
standard of review, fails to cite Idaho authority on point, ignores testimony and documentary 
evidence favorable to Phillips, and neglects to acknowledge his lack of evidentiary objections. 
Evidence that was stipulated to, or never objected to, showed the following. Phillips had a 
recollection of walking down the first two - three steps below the landing and then having "the 
rug pulled out from under him." These were the same steps that were missing two bolts on the 
right side because Erhart chose not to use them. The third step moved, as shown by a stipulated 
photograph and testimony that the step was "off-kilter". Expert testimony confirmed that the 
defects in the steps were all centered near the top of the landing, particularly the same two steps, 
and that this was the likely "tipping point" where Phillips fell. This evidence was easily 
sufficient for the jury to find actual cause. Other stipulated medical records showed the handrail 
and stair moved prior to the fall. Even without the medical records, the physical evidence and 
expert testimony were more than sufficient enough under this Court's precedent. 
There was also sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on whether Erhart's misconduct 
was "willful or reckless" for purposes of eliminating the cap on noneconomic damages under 
I.C. § 6-1603. Among other things, Erhart rebuilt the stairs himself and chose not to use the two 
bolts on the right side of steps two and three, chose a guardrail instead of a handrail, and chose 
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not to secure it. He chose not to get advice regarding his construction practices. He admitted 
that these constituted multiple building code violations and that he was bound by the codes 
minimum safety standards, though he inconsistently contended he could choose to vary from it-
a contention countered by plaintiffs' experts. Most important, the defects in the stairs were 
hidden-the missing bolts were underneath the steps and could not be seen, the handrail looked 
to be attached-and Erhart admitted that hidden hazards must be corrected expeditiously. Yet he 
failed to do so for two and a half years. 
Finally, the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in rejecting Erhart's motion 
for a new trial or remittitur of the jury's loss of consortium award. The court properly assessed 
the testimony of Gale Phillips and treating experts in concluding that she did, in fact, suffer 
unique losses, including the loss of assistance in caring for her two special-needs children. The 
evidence was overwhelming that Jim's personality underwent a dramatic change after the fall, 
and that Gale lost the companionship and affection of her soul-mate partner. And contrary to 
Erhart's assertions, the court applied the correct standard in finding that the disparity between its 
damage estimate and the jury's award was not so great as to suggest the jury's award resulted 
from passion or prejudice. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Erhart seeks judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) 
and (6). His discussion of the relevant standards ofreview (App. Br. at 24) is incomplete. 
Judgment N.O.V. Erhart's motions for a directed verdict and J.N.O.V. are subject to the 
same review standard. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). This 
Court, like the trial court, must view all evidence and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party, and then determine if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
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at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. "Substantial evidence" need not be uncontradicted but need only be 
"of 'such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the 
verdict of the jury was proper."' Coombs v. Curnow, 219 P.3d 453,460 (Idaho 2009) (citation 
omitted). The court "will 'not examine any conflicting evidence presented by the moving party 
to refute the non-moving party's claims."' Id. ( citation omitted). Rather, the moving party 
"necessarily admit[s] the truth of all the [non-movant's] evidence and every legitimate inference 
that could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [that party]." Quick, 111 Idaho at 
763, 727 P.2d at 1191. Likewise, the court may not weigh the evidence, assess witnesses' 
credibility, or compare the jury's findings with those it would have made. Id. 
Erhart repeatedly disregards these standards. Erhart's argument for J.N.O.V. is "based on 
only one interpretation of the evidence ... [ and] ignores other important evidence which was 
also adduced at trial[.]" Id. at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. It is also improperly based new evidentiary 
objections raised for the first time on appeal about evidence Erhart stipulated to at trial. Even if 
he had objected, the Court would not be able to consider his objections now. See Coombs, 219 
P.3d at 461 (courts cannot reconsider admissibility of evidence in ruling on J.N.O.V. motions). 
Erhart's approach-unmoored to the relevant standards-must be rejected. 
New Trial. The trial court had "broad discretion" in ruling on Erhart's motion for a new 
trial, and its decision will be reversed only if it "manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in 
it." Quick, 111 Idaho at 766, 770, 727 P.2d at 1194, 1198 (emphasis in original). A trial judge 
may order a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) based on insufficiency of the evidence only if, "after 
he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the 
witnesses, he concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight 
of the evidence." Id. at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194. However, "respect for the collective wisdom of 
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the jury and the function entrusted to it under [the] constitution suggests the trial judge should, in 
most cases, accept the jury's findings even though he may have doubts about some of their 
conclusions." Id. at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196. 
When a trial judge considers a new trial motion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) based on 
excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the 
judge weighs the evidence and compares the jury's award to the award he would have given had 
there been no jury. Id. "[T]he trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is apparent to the trial 
judge that there is a great disparity" between the jury's award and the award he would have 
given and the "disparity cannot be explained away as simply the product of two separate entities 
valuing the proof of the plaintiff's injuries in two equally fair ways." Id. at 769, 727 P.2d at 
1197 ( emphasis in original). In other words, the disparity must "shock the conscience" of the 
judge or lead the judge to conclude it would be ''unconscionable" to let the award stand. Id. at 
770, 727 P.2d at 1198. Here, as shown below, the trial judge weighed the evidence and properly 
exercised his broad discretion in rejecting Erhart's new trial motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND THAT 
ERHART'S NEGLIGENCE CAUSED JIM PHILLIPS'S INJURIES. 
Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) actual cause, also referred to as cause in 
fact; and (2) legal cause, also referred to as true proximate cause. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 
868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). Erhart challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to 
the first element. (App. Br. at 24-29). As discussed below, this is a quintessential fact question 
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that the judge properly submitted to the jury. In arguing to the contrary, Erhart fails to cite Idaho 
authority that is directly on point and fails to account for important, admitted evidence.6 
"' Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced a particular 
consequence."' Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875,204 P.3d at 515 (citation omitted). A party can 
establish actual cause through circumstantial evidence. Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan 
Ranches, I 02 Idaho 567, 570, 633 P .2d 1145, 1148 (1981 ). "[I]t is only in the rare situation in 
which reasonable minds could not reach different conclusions that the trial court is justified in 
removing the issue [ of causation] from the consideration of the jury." Fouche v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 107 Idaho 701,704,692 P.2d 345,348 (1984). 
Here, the court instructed the jury on the "substantial factor" test, under which a cause 
"need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury, loss or damage." (R. Vol. II at 313 (Instr. # 11)). Erhart does not contest the propriety of 
this instruction on appeal. Thus, "[t]he question is merely whether, giving full consideration to 
the evidence produced by the plaintiff and every legitimate inference which can be drawn 
therefrom, [Erhart's negligence] was a substantial/actor in causing the injuries suffered." 
Fouche, 107 Idaho at 704,692 P.2d at 348 (emphasis in original). 
In a case never cited by Erhart but having strikingly similar facts, this Court reversed a 
directed verdict against a plaintiff who fell down a flight of stairs but could not specifically recall 
whether her fall was caused by a missing handrail. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,678 P.2d 
41 (1984). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was as follows: 
6 At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, Erhart moved for a directed verdict on proximate cause, 
(Tr. p. 921, L. 14 - p. 922, L. 5), but he never moved for a new trial on this basis. Instead, in his 
new trial motion, he argued only that the court should have instructed the jury on "but for" 
causation as opposed to the "substantial factor" test. (R. Vol. II at 353-55). He has dropped his 
instructional error argument on appeal. 
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Mrs. Stephens went to visit friends. While there she had two 
drinks. She returned to her apartment a little past 10:00 p.m .... 
[ and] attempted to go downstairs . . . . As Mrs. Stephens reached 
the top of the stairway, she either slipped or fell forward. She 
testified that she "grabbed" in order to catch herself. However, 
Mrs. Stephens was unable to catch herself and she fell to the 
bottom of the stairs. As a result of the fall, she suffered serious 
injury. The evidence further showed that the stairway was 
approximately thirty-six inches wide and did not have a handrail 
although required by a Boise ordinance. 
Id. at 253, 678 P.2d at 45. The plaintiff also presented expert testimony by an architect, who 
opined that a handrail's primary purpose is for user safety. Id. The trial court granted 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict, stating that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs 
fall was proximately caused by the absence of a handrail, and that any finding of causation 
would necessarily be based only on conjecture and speculation. Id. 
This Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to 
support a jury finding that the absence of the handrail was the actual cause of her injuries: 
[T]here is sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could 
have concluded that the absence of a handrail was the actual cause 
of plaintiff's injuries; i.e., that plaintiff would not have fallen, or at 
least would have been able to catch herself, had there been a 
handrail available for her to grab. 
In addition, we do not believe that the jury would have had to rely 
on conjecture and speculation to find that the absence of the 
handrail was the actual cause. To the contrary, we believe that 
reasonable jurors could have drawn legitimate inferences from the 
evidence presented to determine the issue. This comports with the 
general rule that the factual issue of causation is for the jury to 
decide. In addition, courts in several other jurisdictions, when 
faced with similar factual settings, have held that this issue is a 
question for the jury. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867,872, 749 P.2d 486,491 (1988) 
(Bistline, J., concurring) (concurring with reversal of summary judgment in slip and fall case and 
stating, "the analysis in Stephens v. Stearns [is] readily applicable to the facts at hand," where the 
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parties disputed the cause of plaintiff's fall down a stairwell that had no handrails). The instant 
case is much like Stephens, except that there is far more evidence-including physical 
evidence-supporting the trial court's ruling that causation was a fact issue for the jury. 
First, contrary to Erhart's repeated assertions, Jim Phillips did at one point have a partial 
memory of the fall. Dr. Greenwald testified that when Jim visited her three weeks after the 
incident, he specifically recalled descending the first two to three steps, having "the rug pulled 
out from under him," and then a woman holding his hand. (Tr. p. 321, L. 18 - p. 322, L. 19). 
She read and explained her chart note memorializing his partial recollection to the jury. (/d.; 
exh. 30 at 1 ). Plaintiff's counsel relied on this testimony and chart note in responding to 
defendant's Rule 50(a) motion on causation and in closing argument. (Tr. p. 922, L. 6-18, p. 
1006, L. 19 -p. 1007, L. 4). 
As noted above, Erhart stipulated to admission of the chart note and never objected to any 
of this evidence or argument. Erhart now insists, for the first time, that this evidence was 
inadmissible hearsay. (App. Br. at 28-29). This new argument fails for three separate reasons. 
First, Erhart waived it by not objecting below. See Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921, 104 
P.3d 958, 963 (2004) (party waives objection by failing to object at trial on basis asserted in 
appeal); Wheaton v. Indus. Special Jndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 538,541,928 P.2d 42, 45 (1996) 
("Evidence introduced without objection stands as evidence in the case for all purposes and if 
sufficiently probative may support a finding.") (citation omitted). Second, even ifhe had raised 
the objection, this Court could not consider it as a basis for entering J.N.O.V. See Coombs, 219 
P .3d at 461. Third, Erhart is wrong. Statements made to treating physicians like Dr. Greenwald 
"for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment" and describing "the source" of symptoms or 
pain are excepted from the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is available. I.RE. 803(4); see 
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State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414,418,421, 64 P.3d 340,344,347 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (no abuse 
of discretion when trial court, applying I.R.E. 803( 4), allowed testimony describing how victim 
was injured, though not who injured her). 
Erhart also mischaracterizes the scope of his objection to the occupational medicine 
record, which again states: 
Walking downstairs, step moved, guardrail moved and fell. Legs, 
eyes, head, neck, face, back, elbows. A lot of bumps and bruises. 
(Exh. 26, Activity Status Rpt., 3/23/06). Erhart never objected to the admissibility of this record; 
in fact, he stipulated to its admission. (See Tr. p. 54, L. 1-5). And he did not object to the record 
being read to the jury or to counsel using it in closing argument. (Tr. p. 889, L. 1-22; p. 890, L. 
16-20; p. 1006, L. 8-18). He objected only to a question that invited Gale Phillips to provide the 
substance of her husband's underlying conversation with her. (Tr. p. 889, L. 23 - p. 890, L. 15). 
Accordingly, the occupational medicine record corroborates the jury's finding that 
Erhart's negligence was a substantial factor in the actual cause of the fall. It is not, however, 
necessary to the jury's causation finding. Dr. Greenwald's chart note and testimony concerning 
Jim Phillips's partial recollection (discussed above), combined with the physical evidence and 
expert testimony (discussed below), are easily sufficient to sustain the jury's causation verdict. 
Second, Jim's recollection of descending the first two - three steps from the landing and 
then having "the rug pulled out from under him" dovetails with the physical evidence and the 
expert opinions about the defects in workmanship and the cause of the fall. Both Anglea Sisco 
and Dan Phillips observed the stairway just hours after the fall and immediately noticed that the 
third step from the landing was "off-kilter" and "out of place." (Tr. p. 513, L. 17-24; p. 652, L. 
15 - p. 653, L. 1 ). They photographed the out-of-place step. (Exh. 1 B). 
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This third step from the landing is one of the two steps where Erhart chose not to install 
the two bolts into the predrilled holes, leaving the steps unconnected to the bracket on the right 
side. (Tr. p. 516, L. 7 - p. 517, L. 25; exhs. ID & 2). Mr. Fries opined that this would result in 
overloading the left side and loosening of the bolts over time, and would explain the lateral 
displacement shown in Exhibit 1-B. (Tr. p. 173, L. 21 - p. 175, L. 25). Dr. Gill added that the 
various safety defects were all centered in the same area of the stairway, around the second and 
third steps from the landing. (Tr. p. 244, L. 21 - p. 245, L. 8). He opined that based on hundreds 
of accident reconstructions, this was the most likely place where Jim Phillips lost his balance--
where all of these defects came together. (Tr. p. 245, L. 24 - p. 246, L. 2). 
Angela Sisco testified that that the third step was also missing a bolt head on the left side, 
and she photographed the missing head. (Tr. p. 520, L. 12 - p. 521, L. 14; exh. 87). Dr. Gill 
took a picture of this same area showing where the lag bolt had been stripped out or sheared off 
on the left side of the same tread. (Tr. p. 233, L. 15 - p. 236, L. 6; Appendix, exh. 21-E; see also 
exh. 21-D). And the handrail is not connected at this same level of the stairway. (See supra 
Statement of Facts§ 3; exhs. IG & IH). 
This combined evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, easily 
support a jury finding that Erhart's uncontested negligence was a substantial factor in causing 
Jim Phillips's injuries. Specifically, the evidence supports the findings that Jim Phillips fell from 
the third step below the landing because the step moved, and that the step moved because Erhart 
failed to install bolts in the predrilled hole on the right underside of the step. 
Erhart's contrary arguments border on the frivolous. He fails to acknowledge that he 
never objected to the evidence of Phillips's partial memory; fails to address the photos showing 
the third step out of alignment; fails to address Fries's testimony as to why the step moved; and 
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fails to address all of the bases underlying Gill's conclusions. (See Ans. Br. at 27-29). He 
attacks Gill's opinions, (App. Br. at 28), but "[o]nce an expert's opinion is admitted, it is up to 
the trier of fact to weigh the opinion against any conflicting testimony." Coombs, 219 P .3d at 
461. 
Finally. even if the Court were to disregard both Dr. Greenwald's medical record and 
testimony (to which Erhart never objected at any time) and the occupational medicine record (to 
which Erhart also did not object), there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find causation 
based solely on the physical evidence and expert opinions. The extant case law from this and 
other courts fully supports this conclusion. For instance, in Murphy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 138 
Idaho 88, 91-92, 57 P.3d 799, 802-03 (2002), this Court reversed an order granting summary 
judgment on causation in a slip and fall case. The Court held that the evidence raised a jury 
question whether the plaintiff tripped due to a negligently-maintained railroad walking path, 
even though the plaintiff could not recall exactly what he had stepped on. Id.; see also Blados v. 
Blados, 198 A.2d 213, 214-16 (Conn. 1964) (reversing directed verdict on causation because 
evidence that defendant's outdoor staircase had multiple hazards, including steep angle, treads of 
varying heights, insufficient handrail, and obstruction projecting into stairway, was sufficient for 
jury to find that the defective stairs caused plaintiff to fall to his death); Sullivan v. Hamacher, 
158 N.E.2d 301, 303-04 (Mass. 1959) (affirming denial of directed verdict because evidence that 
landlord failed to maintain a light in hallway was sufficient for jury to find woman fell to her 
death down darkened staircase due to lack of lighting). 
Erhart's heavy reliance on Fedorczyk v. Carribean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 
1996) is misplaced. Erhart quotes at length from the Fedorczyk court's discussion of a 
hypothedca/ slip and fall case where a plaintiff falls down steps-some of which were defective, 
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some not-and does not recall on which step he fell. (App. Br. at 26-27). Erhart highlights most 
of the text of the block quote but fails to highlight the most relevant portion of the hypothetical: 
"No evidence is introduced that tends to prove she stepped on the defective step." Fedorczyk, 
82 F.3d at 75-76. Here, by contrast, there was physical evidence showing that Phillips stepped 
on the defective step. It is undisputed that Phillips attempted to descend the stairway, fell, and 
shortly thereafter the third step from the landing was out of alignment and off-kilter. Even 
without Phillips's stipulated and never-objected-to recollection, this evidence, combined with the 
other physical evidence and expert testimony, would be sufficient for the jury to find causation. 
In sum, this is not one of those "rare situation[s]" where the trial court was required as a 
matter of law to take the issue of proximate causation away from the jury. Fouche, 107 Idaho at 
704, 692 P .2d at 348. There was ample evidence for the jury to find that Erhart's negligence was 
an actual cause of Jim Phillips's fall and injuries. Erhart has furnished no basis whatsoever for 
this Court to upset the trial court's order denying his directed verdict motion. 
II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND THAT 
ERHART ACTED RECKLESSLY. 
The jury specially found that Erhart's conduct was willful or reckless. (R. Vol. II at 336). 
By seeking to overturn this finding, Erhart challenges yet another quintessential fact 
determination forthejury. See O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 72 P.3d 849,854 
(2003) ("Whether an injury is the result of 'willful and wanton' conduct is a question of fact for 
the jury to determine from all the evidence."); Smith v. Bd. of Corr., 133 Idaho 519, 524, 988 
P .2d 1193, 1198 ( 1999) (reversing summary judgment because jury must decide whether conduct 
was reckless, willful and wanton, so as to overcome governmental immunity); Jacobsen v. City 
of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 270-72, 766 P.2d 736, 740-42 (1988) (reversing summary judgment 
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because jury must decide whether conduct was willful and wanton, so as to impose liability on 
landowner for trespasser injuries on playground equipment near water-filled ditch). 
The jury's finding meant that the cap on noneconomic damages under I.C. § 6-1603( I) 
did not apply. See I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a) (limitation on noneconomic damages does not apply to 
"[ c ]auses of actions arising out of willful or reckless misconduct"). This Court has not 
interpreted this provision of the statute.7 Over plaintiffs' objection, at Erhart's urging, the trial 
court instructed the jury to evaluate the evidence using I.D.J.I. 2.25, but substituting ''willful or 
reckless misconduct" for the term ''willful and wanton". (Tr. p. 982, L. 7 - p. 992, L. 12). The 
court instructed the jury: 
The words "willful or reckless misconduct" when used in these 
instructions and when applied to the allegations in this case, mean 
more than ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or 
reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew 
or should have known that the actions not only created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of 
probability that such harm would actually result. 
R. Vol. II at 321 (Instr. # 19) ( emphasis added). 
Erhart cites authorities setting forth a wide variety of formulations of what constitutes 
willful and wanton misconduct. (App. Br. at 29-31 ). But at his request, the jury was given the 
above instruction, and that instruction sets forth the only legal test that applies on appeal. Thus, 
the question presented is whether, "review[ing] the evidence as a whole, drawing all inferences 
in the light most favorable to [the Phillipses'], and view[ing] the facts as if [Erhart] has admitted 
the truth of all the [the Phillipses'] evidence," Coombs, 219 P.3d at 460 (citation and quotation 
7 Erhart repeatedly misstates the jury's finding of "willful or reckless" misconduct as being for 
''willful and wanton" or "willful and reckless" conduct. (App. Br. at 7, 23, 29-40). The comment 
to I.D.J.I. 2.25 suggests there may be no difference in the standard regardless of the terms used. 
This Court, however, has not addressed the impact of the Legislature's use of the disjunctive 
''willful or reckless misconduct" in I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a). That issue is not presented because 
Erhart's requested instruction was submitted to the jury, and it articulates the test applicable here. 
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marks omitted), the jury could find that Erhart "should have known" two things: ( 1) his actions 
created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, and (2) there was a high degree of probability 
that such harm would occur. As the trial court repeatedly held, (Tr. p. 924, L. 1-5; p. 984, L. 6-
12; R. Vol. III at 569-71 ), there was sufficient evidence for the jury to make this finding. 
The evidence established that Erhart should have known that in rebuilding the stairway in 
2003 and ignoring its subsequent deterioration, he was creating an unreasonable risk of harm and 
such harm was highly probable to occur. Erhart chose to replace the stairs himself. He chose not 
to install two of four bolts in the right side of the second and third step from the landing. He 
chose not to get supplier or manufacturer advice on the propriety of that action. He chose to not 
attach the deficient handrail. He thus knew that the bolts were missing and that tenants would 
not be aware of the latent defects. He chose not to subsequently inspect the installation to insure 
no problems. He chose not to use shims or washers to install the bolts. He admitted that he 
"certainly" could have used a shim, and his own expert opined that using a shim or washers-as 
he did on the second flight of stairs-would have been "easy" to do. He chose not to do so 
merely because he would have had to come back another day. He didn't want to slow the job 
down; he wanted to get it done. (See supra Statement of Facts,§ 5, collecting record citations). 
Erhart repeatedly contends he was somehow justified in failing to take the time to use a 
shim or washers to install the missing bolts, and in failing to consult with the manufacturer or 
supplier, because he replaced the steps on a Sunday, and his tenants were returning to work on 
Monday. (App. Br. at 13, 33, 36). But he never explains why he could not and did not do so on 
Monday, or Tuesday, or the following weekend, or for that matter, any other day in the more 
than 850 days between the date he installed the steps and the date Jim Phillips fell. Nor did he 
ever explain why the handrail was unconnected to the metal support. 
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Moreover, just weeks before the incident, Kenneth Doolittle warned Erhart that "at least 
one" of the steps on the stairway was loose. Though Doolittle did not remember which step was 
loose, he told Erhart that the step wasn't anchored to the side such that if you pushed on it, it 
would slide backwards. Erhart was thus notified about a problem precisely like the one that 
caused Jim Phillips's fall. (See supra Statement of Facts,§ 5). At a minimum, this met the test 
for recklessness articulated in Erhart's own tendered instruction. He should have known there 
was a high probability that a fall was the kind of harm that would occur. Cf Athay v. Stacey, 146 
Idaho 407,414, 196 P.3d 325,332 (2008) (reckless disregard "only requires knowledge of the 
high degree of probability of the kind of harm that the injured party suffered") (emphasis 
added). 8 
Moreover, when a landlord knows or has reason to know of a hidden, dangerous 
condition, he must make the condition safe or warn invitees about it, and the failure to do so 
constitutes willful and wanton conduct. Latimer v. Latimer, 384 N.E.2d 107, 108-09 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1978); Goodman v. Clausen, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17067, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May I, 1984). 
Erhart testified that 50-70 people per day go up and down these stairs. (Tr. p. 136, L. 5-16). 
Exposing this many people to the defects was reckless, given that the missing bolts were on the 
underside of the steps and not visible to people using the stairs. He should have known that, over 
a period of two and a half years, there was a high degree of probability his unbolted steps would 
cause an accident. The same holds true for his unconnected handrail. 
8 Prior to trial, on a less complete record, the trial judge concluded that Erhart's conduct "might 
even be characterized as 'an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct."' (R. Vol. 
II at 219). The judge did not allow an amendment for punitive damages, however, because the 
facts at that time did not establish the requisite "harmful state of mind." (Id.) Of course, the 
recklessness instruction that Erhart requested and the court gave only required that Erhart 
"should have known" of the high degree of probability of harm. 
38 
According to Dr. Gill, Erhart's maintenance of the stairs was "like a game of Russian 
Roulette". (Tr. p. 211, L. 21 - p. 212, L. 4 ). Given the defects Erhart created, "sooner or later, 
the laws of probability are such that ... an accident happens." (Tr. p. 213, L. 1-4). Dr. Gill 
added that Erhart, a commercial building landlord, should have had a safety or risk management 
program, which need not have been expensive in order to identify foreseeable hazards. He noted 
such a program was critical because if conditions remained unchecked, they were a hazard lying 
in wait. This was the case here, where the defects in the staircase---e.g., missing bolts 
underneath the steps and handrail-were not visible to tenants. Erhart admitted that hidden 
dangers must be addressed expeditiously. (See supra Statement of Facts, § 5). 
Erhart notes that an expert's opinion about the need for a safety plan is "not conclusive." 
(App. Br. at 38). He thus misconstrues the applicable standard ofreview. Gill's opinion that 
Erhart-a professional owner/operator of commercial buildings-had no safety program was 
merely one piece of evidence showing Erhart's recklessness. The relevant question is whether 
the jury could determine that his conduct was willful or reckless "from all the evidence." 
O'Guin, 139 Idaho at 14, 72 P.3d at 854. 
Erhart also committed multiple building code violations. This included his failure to 
install the two bolts in both the second and third steps from the landing; his use of a Trex 
guardrail that instead of a handrail; and his use of a handrail that was too wide and did not extend 
far enough into the landing to be safe. Worse, he never secured the handrail, allowing it to be 
easily moved or lifted. (See supra Statement of Facts, § 5). He admitted he was required to 
follow the building code, but in the next breath, claimed he could deviate from it. (Tr. p. 102, L. 
20 - p. 108, L. 10). The trial court properly considered this to be evidence ofrecklessness. (R. 
Vol. III at 571). 
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Finally, tenant Angela Sisco was not surprised when she learned of the dangerous 
condition of the stairs on March 20, 2006. It was indicative of Erhart's pattern of neglect: 
repairs "were either half-assed completed or not done or pushed off." Erhart's willingness to 
ignore dangers he created was underscored by Erhart's own hired safety engineer, Ernie Harper, 
who found that the handrail was still loose and unconnected on his visit to the site on June 22, 
2006, three months after Jim Phillips's injury. (Tr. p. 957, L. 18 - p. 958, L. 7). 
In sum, the evidence and reasonable inferences, taken as a whole, and viewed in a light 
most favorable to the Phillipses, provided a more than legally sufficient basis for the jury's 
finding that Erhart was not only negligent but reckless. As the trial court concluded, there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Erhart should have known his actions created an 
unreasonable risk of harm and a high degree of probability the harm would result. The court thus 
properly rejected Erhart's directed verdict, J.N.O.V., and new trial motions on this point. 
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF GALE 
PHILLIPS'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM DAMAGE A WARD. 
Erhart finally contends that Gale Phillips's damages for loss of consortium were 
excessive and requests a new trial or remittitur under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Under this rule, a trial 
court must determine whether excessive damages appear to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). To make this determination, the court weighs the 
evidence and compares the jury's award to the award it would have given had there been no jury. 
Quick, 111 Idaho at 769, 727 P.2d at 1197. This determination will be upheld "unless the trial 
court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it[.]" Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 
625, 603 P.2d 575, 580 (1979). Here, the record establishes that the trial judge recognized his 
decision as one involving discretion and acted well within the limits of his discretion. 
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Loss of consortium is a derivative cause of action based on another party's tortious injury 
to a spouse. Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 131 Idaho 254,256, 953 P.2d 1363, 
1365 (1998). "[T]he extent of the injury to the injured spouse will determine the scope of the 
loss of consortium." Id.; see also Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 534, 903 P .2d 110, 123 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he extent of [the spouse's] injuries has a direct bearing on [the] claim for 
loss of consortium."). However, there is no dollar-for-dollar correlation between a primary 
plaintiff's economic and non-economic damage awards and a loss of consortium award. Rather, 
loss of consortium incorporates its own distinct elements, including "the loss of consortium, care, 
comfort, society, companionship, services and protection of [the] husband." Rind/is baker v. 
Wilson, 95 Idaho 752,755,519 P.2d 421,424 (1974). The jury was thus instructed: 
"Loss of consortium" means the loss of the aid, care, comfort, 
society, companionship, services, protection and conjugal affection 
of an injured spouse. 
(R. Vol. II at 324 (Instr.# 22).) 
Erhart nonetheless bases his challenge to Gale Phillips' loss of consortium award on the 
supposed rule that loss of consortium awards, as a matter oflaw, must be significantly lower than 
the award to the primary plaintiff. (See App. Br. at 41-45). But he fails to cite a single case that 
supports this proposition. Contrary to his contention, the Seventh Circuit in Abernathy v. 
Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983), did not suggest that any such "ratio" 
requirement exists. It simply held that on the facts before it even assuming the jury awarded the 
plaintiff the full amount he sought for pain and suffering and awarded his wife half that amount, 
her losses "could not be so great" based on the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 973-74. 
And while Erhart cites Idaho cases where spouses recovered loss of consortium damages 
in amounts far less than the primary plaintiffs' damages, (App. Br. at 42-43), this Court did not 
establish any rule requiring proportionality between the two damage awards. Thus, the cases 
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indicate nothing more than that different juries have made different loss-of-consortium awards 
based on different circumstances. In fact, in at least one case, the spouse received loss of 
consortium damages even though the primary plaintiff had received no non-economic damages 
whatsoever. See Browning v. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 10,995 P.2d 351,355 (2000). 
Moreover, other courts have consistently rejected this proportionality argument, noting 
that loss of consortium damages are based on different elements and thus need not stay within 
any particular ratio of the underlying damage awards. See, e.g., Fuller v. Moser, 539 So.2d 784, 
7 86 (La. Ct. App. 1989) ("[Defendant] contends that a spouse's award for loss of consortium 
must be less than the amount awarded to the other spouse for his or her bodily injury. We are 
aware of no such proposition oflaw."); Clifton v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 686 S.W.2d 309,318 
(Tex. App. 1985) ("The determination of the amount of the award rests with the jury and there is 
no set formula to follow."), aff din relevant part, 709 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. 1986); Ellenberger 
v. Van Vorst, 1991 WL 113582, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991) ("The Court declines to assess the 
consortium award on the basis of a simple mathematical comparison to the main award. The 
consortium award must be viewed in its own right to determine whether it is so excessive as to 
offend the Court's sense of justice."). The trial court was therefore correct in concluding that 
there is no fixed ratio and that "[e]ach case must stand on its own." (R. Vol. III at 579). 
Erhart's remaining contentions involve a futile, misguided, and even cynical attempt to 
challenge the court's exercise of its broad discretion. At trial, Erhart systematically minimized 
Jim Phillips's injuries. Erhart falsely claimed that Phillips walked out of the emergency room 
after his injury and that his test results showed no evidence of brain trauma. (Tr. p. 46, L. 8 -
p. 47, L. 9). Erhart's retained neuropsychologist opined that by date of trial, Phillips was 
completely healed, was over-reporting his pain, and was falsely attributing his pain, anxiety, and 
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depression to his brain injury, when his symptoms were in fact caused by emotional and 
environmental factors. (Tr. p. 46, L. 18 - p. 48, L. 18; p. 798, L. 20 - p. 802, L. 25). Erhart's 
hired physician blamed Phillips's problems on sleep apnea and tight hamstrings, (Tr. p. 727, 
L. 25 - p. 729, L. 18; p. 729, L. 19 - p. 731, L. 6), though he ultimately admitted there was no 
evidence Phillips had sleep apnea. (Tr. p. 742, L. 13 - p. 745, L. 18). The trial court described 
the evidence supporting the damages theories proffered by defendant as "thin, to say the least." 
(R. Vol. III at 579). 
Ironically, after insisting below that Jim Phillips suffered only mild injuries that have all 
healed, Erhart now attempts to use the nature and severity of Jim's traumatic brain injury and 
post-concussive syndrome against Gale, stating that her losses could not be so great. This effort 
must fail for two reasons. First, the extent of Jim's injuries enhance, rather than detract from, 
Gale's losses. They prove how dramatically he has changed as a person, as a professional, as a 
husband, and as a father, and thus, how those changes have impacted Gale. See supra Statement 
of Facts, § 6. Second, Gale's injuries are unique. She is the mother of two special-needs 
teenagers, a burden most mothers and wives do not carry. The loss of Jim's services and support 
are thus magnified in ways that are not present in most loss of consortium cases. 
Before the fall, Jim was a devoted husband and father who was significantly involved in 
his children's upbringing and care. After the fall, the assistance he provided to Gale with their 
care--cooking, helping with their homework, interfacing with their doctors, taking them on trips 
and other activities----ceased. See id. §6.b. These are undeniably services provided not just to the 
children but also to Gale, who is responsible for them. See Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 
205,418 P.2d 562,568 (1966) (affirming loss of consortium award to wife where husband was 
in the hospital for two months and unable to help with, among other things, ''the care of the 
43 
children"). 9 Instead of having help with her two disabled children, Gale now has another 
disabled person in the home. Indeed, since the fall, Jim's needs interfere with his children's care. 
She cannot even trust him to stay home with the boys. See id. Gale has had to change the family 
lifestyle and help the children understand Jim's difficulties. (Tr. p. 684, L. 20 - p. 685, L. 16). 
Moreover, since the fall, Jim's whole personality has changed. He is no longer the 
outgoing and gregarious outdoorsman, the dancing theatrical performer, or the affectionate 
husband. He has become introverted and likes to be by himself all the time. He has become 
moody, irritable, and emotionally labile. And he has become the opposite ofromantic--<::alling 
Gale bad names. He has stopped being physically intimate with Gale. In fact, he did not touch 
her from the day of the fall until the day they came to court. As Gale's friend put it, Gale has 
lost the person who was her "soul mate partner." See supra Statement of Facts,§ 6.b. 
The trial judge personally observed this and other evidence. The judge did say, as Erhart 
notes, that Gale was "somewhat over-dramatic and self-interested" and that Erhart "might have a 
point" if the loss of consortium award were based "solely on her testimony as to her damages[.]" 
(R. Vol. III at 579). The judge, however, found that the testimony of the family physician, Dr. 
Martin, and the family therapist, Dr. Andrews, alone provided sufficient corroborating evidence. 
(Id.) There was substantial additional corroborating evidence adduced from other family 
members and friends. 
Finally, and contrary to Erhart's contentions, the court correctly applied the Dinneen 
standard, as shown by Barnett v. Eagle Helicopters, Inc., 123 Idaho 361, 848 P.2d 419 (Idaho 
9 On appeal, Erhart raises a host of evidentiary objections for the first time, including relevancy 
objections to evidence that Gale needed medication and counseling, had to help Jim with work, 
etc. (App. Br. at 46). But he never objected to any of this evidence at trial, never sought a 
limiting instruction, and never otherwise contested this evidence below. He thus waived any 
alleged error. Slack, 104 P.3d at 963. 
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1993). In Barnett, the trial court "found a disparity" between the amount it would have awarded 
and the amount the jury awarded, "but not a disparity so great that the court was of the belief that 
the verdict must have come from passion or prejudice." Id. at 363, 365, 848 P.2d at 421,423. 
The court also found that ''the award did not shock the conscience." Id. at 365, 848 P.2d at 423. 
This Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in weighing the evidence and 
deferring to the jury's award. Id. 
Likewise, the trial court here was "surprised by the size of the verdict. Surprised, but not 
shocked." (R. Vol. III at 579). The court stated that it would not have made either Mr. or Mrs. 
Phillips an award as large as the jury's. (Id.). But importantly, the court added that while it had 
"not calculated a precise number of each element of damage it would have awarded," 
the Court does not find the amounts awarded by the jury in this 
case to be so disparate from the rough numbers it would have 
awarded so as to show the jury was operating under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. 
(Id. at 580). Thus court thus weighed the evidence, came up with a rough estimate of what it 
would have awarded, compared it to the jury's award, and applied the relevant standard. 
Erhart is simply wrong in suggesting that the trial court required him to "show" passion 
or prejudice. (App. Br. at 45). The court applied the correct standard. (R. Vol. III. at 566-67, 
stating that under IRCP 59(a)(5), "a trial court may grant a new trial for 'excessive or inadequate 
damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice"') ( emphasis 
added). The court's single, off-hand use of the term "show" in its conclusion was no more error 
than this Court's use of the term ''must" in Barnett. See Barnett, 123 Idaho at 365, 848 P.2d at 
423. 
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In sum, the trial court properly applied the legal test and sensibly exercised its wide 
discretion upholding the loss of consortium award. Given that no manifest abuse of discretion 
has been shown, this Court should affirm the trial court's carefully-considered judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Erhart fails to apply the basic standards of review, ignores controlling legal precedent, 
disregards substantial evidence to which he never objected, and does nothing more than disagree 
with the trial judge's exercise of his reasoned discretion. For these reasons, the Phillipses ask the 
Court to affirm the Amended Judgment in all respects, and award them costs on appeal. 
T. Edwards (IS o. 4210) 
Kurt Holzer (ISB o. 4557) 
Holzer & Edwards, Chtd. 
1516 West Hays 
Boise, ID 83 702-5316 
Phone: (208) 386-9119 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
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Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned certifies they filed with the Clerk of the Idaho 
Supreme Court an original and seven (7) copies of Respondents' Brief and that they served two 
(2) copies of Respondents' Brief on the following attorneys: 
David W. Cantrill (ISB No. 1291) 
Daniel J. Skinner (ISB No. 7225) 
Cantrill Skinner Sullivan & King, LLP 
14 23 Tyrell Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone: (208) 344-8035 
Edward M. Kay (pro hac vice) 
Kimbley A. Kearney (pro hac vice) 
Clausen Miller P.C. 
IO South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, IL 60603 
Phone: (312) 855-10 IO 
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APPENDIX 
INDEX OF ATTACHED TRIAL EXHIBITS 
1. lA Photo oflower flight of stairs taken on day of incident 
2. 1B Photo taken by Dan Phillips while standing on step 
3. lD Photo showing steps with missing bolts 
4. lG Photo showing handrail not attached near landing 
5. lH Photo of loose handrail near landing 
6. 2, p. l Photo showing steps with missing bolts labeled 
7. 2, p. 4 Photo showing close-up of washers used as spacers on second flight of stairs 
8. 21E Photo showing location on left side of step 3 where lag bolt head sheared 
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